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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT-EQUAL PROTEC-
TION CLAUSE-ADOPTION-RIGHTS OF PUTATIVE FATHERS-The United
States Supreme Court has held that a New York statute providing
that a natural mother could withhold her consent to the adoption of
her child, but denying the same right to an unwed father, violates the
equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment.
Caban v. Mohammed, 99 S. Ct. 1760 (1979).
In January, 1976, New York resident Kazim Mohammed and his
wife, Maria Mohammed, filed a petition under section 110 of the New
York Domestic Relations Law1 seeking to adopt David Andrew Caban
and Denise Caban.! David and Denise were illegitimate children
parented by Maria Mohammed and Abdiel Caban, who had lived
together in New York City from September of 1968 until the end of
1973. During this time, Caban and Mohammed represented themselves
as being husband and wife, although they never legally married.3
Throughout their relationship, both the natural mother and the
putative father' were employed and contributed to the support of the
family.5 Maria eventually left Caban, taking their children with her,
and took up residence with the appellee, whom she later married.'
Caban continued to visit, support, and participate in the rearing of the
children following Maria's departure.'
Given his relationship with the children, and in response to the
Mohammed adoption petition, Caban and his wife cross-petitioned
1. N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 110 (McKinney 1977), which governs who may adopt, pro-'
vides in pertinent part:
An adult unmarried person or an adult husband and his adult wife together
may adopt another person. An adult or minor husband and his adult or minor wife
together may adopt a child of either of them born in or out of wedlock and an adult
or minor husband or an adult or minor wife may adopt such a child of the other
spouse.
2. Caban v. Mohammed, 99 S. Ct. 1760, 1763 (1979).
3. Id
4. The term putative father refers to the alleged or reputed father of an illegitimate
child. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1402 (Rev. 4th ed. 1968).
5. 99 S. Ct. at 1763; Brief for Appellant at 10.
6. 99 S. Ct. at 1763.
7. Id In September of 1974, Maria's mother, Delores Gonzales, left New York to
take up residence in Puerto Rico. At the Mohammeds' request, the grandmother took
David and Denise with her. Caban communicated with the children through his parents
who also resided in Puerto Rico. In November of 1975, Caban went to Puerto Rico, taking
custody of the children from a willing Gonzales. Caban then returned with the children to
New York City. Id. On January 15, 1976, the Family Court of New York issued a tem-
porary order placing the children with the mother and awarding visitation rights to the
father pending a trial on the merits. Brief for Appellant at 14.
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under section 110 for adoption of the children.! After a hearing on the
petition, a New York surrogate in Kings County, New York, granted
the Mohammeds' petition to adopt the children,' thereby terminating
Caban's parental rights and obligations." The surrogate noted that sec-
tion 111 foreclosed Caban from adopting David and Denise because the
natural mother had withheld her consent." Furthermore, Caban had
not offered any evidence to indicate that the Mohammeds were unfit
parents for the children." The surrogate rejected Caban's argument"
that section 111 violated the equal protection clause of the fourteenth
amendment" by requiring the mother to consent to adoption in all situ-
ations," yet at the same time requiring a father's consent only if he
had been or was legally married to the mother,"' was a surviving
spouse, or had custody of the child. The surrogate based his decision
on the earlier New York Court of Appeals decision in In re Adoption of
Malpica-Orsini,"' in which the court, in a similar fact situation" rejected
a putative father's constitutional objections to the Act.' The Orsini
8. 99 S. Ct. at 1764. For the text of § 110, see note 1 supra.
9. 99 S. Ct. at 1764.
10. Id. N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 117 (McKinney 1977) provides that "la]fter the making
of an order of adoption the natural parents of the adoptive child shall be relieved of all
parental duties toward and of all responsibilities for and shall have no rights over such
adoptive child or his property by descent or succession ....
11. 99 S. Ct. at 1765. N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 111 (McKinney 1977), which governs the
consent required, provides in pertinent part:
1. Subject to the limitations hereinafter set forth consent to adoption shall be
required as follows:
(b) Of the parents or surviving parent, whether adult or infant, of a child born
in wedlock;
(c) Of the mother, whether adult or infant, of a child born out of wedlock;
(d) Of any person or authorized agency having lawful custody of the adoptive
child.
12. 99 S. Ct. at 1765.
13. Id. at 1766.
14. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 provides that "[n]o state shall ... deny to any per-
son within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."
15. See N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 111(1)(b), (c) (McKinney 1977).
16. See id § 111(1)(b).
17. See id § 111(1)(d).
18. 36 N.Y. 2d 568, 311 N.E.2d 486, 370 N.Y.S.2d 511, appeal dismissed sub nom. Or-
sini v. Blasi, 423 U.S. 1042 (1977).
19. The parents of the child cohabitated prior to and following the birth of their
child. The putative father acknowledged paternity, provided support for the child, and
shared parental responsibilities. After the period of cohabitation ended, the father con-
tinued to support and maintain personal contact with the child. 36 N.Y.2d at 569, 331
N.E.2d at 487, 370 N.Y.S.2d at 513.
20. The putative father in Orsini, like Caban, questioned the constitutionality of
§ 111. Id. at 569, 331 N.E.2d at 487, 370 N.Y.S.2d at 513.
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court had utilized a rational relationship standard of review2 and had
held that since a legislative enactment carries with it a strong pre-
sumption of constitutionality,' the putative father's equal protection
challenge had to be dismissed because he did not meet the heavy bur-
den of proving the statute's invalidity. 8
After Caban had exhausted his state appeals," the United States
Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction' to decide whether the
statutory distinction drawn between the adoptive rights of an unwed
father and those of other parents violated the equal protection clause
of the fourteenth amendment." Finding that it did, the Court reversed
the judgment of the New York Court of Appeals."
Justice Powell, speaking for a five man majority,' initially found
that section 111 treated unwed fathers differently than other parents."'
The Court noted that under the provisions of section 111, an unwed
mother clearly had the right to withhold her consent to a proposed
adoption of her illegitimate child. Since an unwed father had no similar
control over the fate of his child, even where his parental relationship
was as substantial as that of the mother, it was indisputable that unwed
fathers were treated unequally.' This unequal treatment effectively
gave the mother the right to control the fate of the child since under
New York law adoption is impermissible without the consent of the
unwed mother. 1 Thus, in the instant controversy, Maria could prevent
Abdiel's adoption of the children simply by withholding her consent,
although Abdiel could prevent Maria from adopting their children only
21. This standard presumes that a statutory classification is constitutionally valid
provided that it is rationally related to a legitimate state interest. Id. at 570-71, 331
N,E.2d at 488, 370 N.Y.S.2d at 514-15.
22. The Orsini court further noted that this constitutional presumption is rebuttable
if unconstitutionality can be demonstrated beyond a reasonable doubt; that every intend-
ment is in favor of the validity of the statute; that the party alleging unconstitutionality
has a heavy burden; that only as a last resort will courts strike down legislative enact-
ments on the ground of unconstitutionality; and that courts may not substitute their judg-
ment for that of the legislature as to the wisdom and expediency of the legislation. Id
23. Id. The Orsini court also found that the equal protection clause does not deny to
states the power to treat different classes of persons in different ways if the classification
has a fair and substantial relationship to the object of the legislation. Id at 571-72, 331
N.E.2d at 488-89, 370 N.Y.S.2d at 515-16.
24. See Kazim M. v. Abdiel C., 56 App. Div. 2d 627, 391 N.Y.S.2d 846, appeal dis-
missed, 43 N.Y.2d 708, 372 N.E.2d 42, 401 N.Y.S.2d 208 (1977).
25. 436 U.S. 903 (1978).
26. 99 S. Ct. at 1764.
27. Id. at 1769.
28. The majority also included Justices Brennan, White, Marshall and Blackman.
29. 99 S. Ct. at 1766.
30. Id. at 1765-66.
31. See Gordan K. v. Martin L., 45 N.Y.2d 383, 38 N.E.2d 266, 408 N.Y.S.2d 439
(1978).
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if he could show that her adoption of the children would not be in the
children's best interest. Accordingly, Justice Powell ruled that the dif-
fering treatment of unmarried parents was based upon sex.'
After concluding that section 111 created a sex-based classification,
the Caban Court analyzed its prior decisions on the constitutionality of
gender-based distinctions. Relying upon Reed v. Reed' and Craig v.
Boren," cases in which the Court had held that gender-based distinc-
tions must serve governmental objectives, to withstand judicial scru-
tiny under the equal protection clause,' Mohammed asserted that the
distinction was justified because there was a fundamental difference
between maternal and paternal relationships in that a natural mother
has a closer relationship with her child than does the father. The
Caban majority dismissed this argument, noting that maternal and
paternal roles are not invariably different in importance. Even if
unwed mothers as a class were closer than unwed fathers to their new-
born infants, this generalization about parent-child relations becomes
less acceptable as a basis for legislative distinctions as the age of the
child increases. Because the Caban children were not infants, the Court
concluded that the maternal and paternal roles were equalized."
The Court then examined the state's interest in promoting the adop-
tion of illegitimate children. Justice Powell conceded that various pur-
poses were served by the New York adoption consent scheme, since
fathers could not deny illegitimate children the blessings of adoption,
nor cause unnecessary delays in the adoption process. 7 He stated,
however, that the state's interest in promoting adoption could not be
furthered through the use of a gender-based distinction.u The Court
held that classifications must be reasonable, and have a fair and sub-
stantial relationship to the object of the legislation. New York's legisla-
tive objective was to expedite the adoption of its illegitimate children
by requiring only maternal consent. If the consent of both parents was
required, there would be unnecessary delays and the possibility of
32. 99 S. Ct. at 1766.
33. 404 U.S. 71 (1971). Reed involved a challenge to an Idaho statute which gave
preference to males as administrators of estates. The Court held that sex, although not
suspect per se, could not be used to afford different treatment to similarly situated indi-
viduals absent a legitimate government purpose. Sex did not have a rational relationship
to the purpose of providing competent administrators for estates in Idaho. Id. at 76-77.
34. 429 U.S. 190 (1976). Craig involved a challenge to an Oklahoma statute which pro-
vided separate legal drinking ages for men (21) and women (18). The Court held that the
statute was unconstitutional since the 18-21 age requirement did not serve the asserted
government purpose of increasing highway safety. Id at 200-03.
35. 99 S. Ct. at 1766.
36. Id. at 1766-67.
37. Id. at 1767.
38. Id. at 1768.
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criminal activities such as blackmail and extortion. Even if fathers
would block the adoption of their children, it would, in the view of the
Caban Court, be motivated by concern for the welfare of the child
rather than by a negative or vindictive attitude. 9 According to Justice
Powell, the putative father in the instant controversy was an example
of such a concerned parent because of his continued participation in
the rearing and support of his children."
The Court recognized that practical difficulties in locating putative
fathers for their consent to adoption could conceivably result in the
delayed placement of children."' However, even if the difficulties justi-
fied a legislative distinction between mothers and fathers of newborns,
a point the Court did not decide, those difficulties did not justify a
distinction extending beyond infancy."' The Court reasoned that the
difficulty in locating the putative father of an older child did not
justify an inflexible distinction because the equal protection clause pro-
tects only those fathers who in fact have come forward to participate
in the rearing of their child. If a case involved a putative father who
had not come forward, such as one involving a mother and child who
were abandoned by the father," the state could withhold the father's
privilege of vetoing the adoption of the child." Therefore, the Court
ruled that where a father acknowledges paternity and has established
a substantial relationship with his child, the right to consent or with-
hold consent must be preserved.' Justice Powell concluded that the
differing treatment afforded unwed fathers and unwed mothers did not
bear a substantial relationship to the state's interest in promoting the
adoption of illegitimate children. Thus, the Court held that section 111
was an overbroad, gender-based classification which discriminated
arbitrarily against unwed fathers who had participated in the support
of their non-infant children.
39. Id (citing Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971)). See note 33 and text accompanying
notes 33-36 supra.
40. 99 S. Ct. at 1763. See note 7 and accompanying text supra.
41. 99 S. Ct. at 1768.
42. Id. at 1768 n.11.
43. Id at 1768-69.
44. Id at 1769. Under the provisions of New York's Social Services Law, abandon-
ment would include the situation in which the father has never come forward to partici-
pate in the rearing of the child. See N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW § 371 (McKinney Supp. 1979).
45. 99 S. Ct. at 1768.
46. Id. at 1769.
47. Id The Court stated:
The effect of New York's classification is to discriminate against unwed fathers
even when their identity is known and they have manifested a significant paternal
interest in the child. The facts of this case illustrate the harshness of classifying
unwed fathers as being invariably less qualified and entitled than mothers to exer-
1980 379
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Justice Stewart dissented. He contended that the state's interest in
promoting the welfare of illegitimate children was of far greater im-
portance than the majority suggested.'8 Unlike the majority, Justice
Stewart found that the state had not advanced this interest at the ex-
pense of Caban's equal protection or due process rights. He reasoned
that since contested adoptions in New York were governed by the
"best interest" of the child standard, the putative father's due process
rights were fulfilled by his opportunity to express his concerns about
the child's welfare.'9 Turning to the equal protection challenge to the
gender-based classification adoption scheme, Justice Stewart stated
that the equal protection clause is not violated unless men and women
are in fact similarly situated in the area covered by the legislation. In
the case of newborn children, and absent the legal tie of marriage, he
opined that the unwed father and unwed mother are not similarly situ-
ated.' In the instant case, however, the father was similarly situated
to the mother because both had established a close relationship with
the children. Nevertheless, Justice Stewart ruled that it was neither
the mother's nor the father's interest that was paramount, but instead
was the child's interest in being legitimized.51 In Justice Stewart's
view, the father's equal protection rights would not be violated unless
there had first been a finding that adoption by the father would serve
the best interest of the child, and in the face of such a finding the
mother had been permitted to veto the adoption.62 Since no such action
occurred in Caban, Justice Stewart concluded that the legislative goal
cise a concerned judgment as to the fate of their children. Section 111 both ex-
cludes some loving fathers from full participation in the decision whether their
children will be adopted and, at the same time, enables some alienated mothers
arbitrarily to cut off the paternal rights of fathers. We conclude that this undiffer-
entiated distinction between unwed mothers and unwed fathers, applicable in all
circumstances where adoption of a child of theirs is at issue, does not bear a sub-
stantial relationship to the State's asserted interests.
Id. The Supreme Court distinguished its earlier decision in Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S.
246 (1978), which held that a Georgia statute did not deny a putative father due process of
law by denying him the right to consent to his child's adoption when the best interests of
the child were not promoted by the consent. Id at 251-55. The majority noted that in
Quilloin, unlike Caban, the father did not participate regularly in the rearing or support
of the child nor did he seek to adopt the child, but only attempted to veto the adoption by
the mother and her husband. 99 S. Ct. at 1766-67 n.7.
48. 99 S. Ct. at 1769 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
49. Id at 1770 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
50. Id. The dissent noted that historically, basic biological differences have led to a
custodial presumption in favor of the mother. Further, where an unwed father has not
come forward and has not established a relationship with the child he is plainly not in a
situation similar to the mother's. Id at 1772 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
51. Id.
52. Id. at 1772-73 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
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of facilitating adoptions that are in the best interest of illegitimate
children was served by the gender-based classification.'
Justice Stevens, with whom the Chief Justice and Justice Rehnquist
joined, expressed the concern that a mutual consent requirement would
complicate and delay the adoption process." Furthermore, Justice
Stevens contended that the person challenging the constitutionality of
statutes such as section 111 should be required to demonstrate the un-
fairness of its application in a significant number of situations before
the Court can properly conclude that it violates the equal protection
clause." He urged that it was unwise to test the conformance of rules
to the principle of equality simply by reference to exceptional cases
such as Caban's."
Caban v. Mohammed comports with the Court's previous decision in-
volving gender-based parental classifications, the first of which was
Stanley v. Illinois.57 In Stanley, the Court adopted a rationale which
balanced the interests of both the parent and the child." The Illinois
statute involved in Stanley did not include unwed fathers in the legis-
lative definition of parent." Thus, the unwed father was viewed not as
a parent but as a stranger to his child in matters of custody and adop-
tion." When the unwed father's illegitimate partner for eighteen years
died, he was left with their three children."1 Pursuant to the statutory
scheme," the children became wards of the state upon the death of
their mother. Without the benefit of a hearing to determine Peter
Stanley's fitness as a parent, the state removed the children from
Stanley's care and custody and placed them in the care of a guardian"
upon a showing that the children had no legal parent living." Stanley
claimed that he was denied equal protection of the law because of the
53. Id. at 1773 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
54. Id. at 1776 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
55. Id. at 1779 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
56. Id. at 1778-79 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens also stressed that given
the millions of adoptions granted, the Caban decision should not be applied retroactively.
Id. at 1781 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
57. 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
58. Id. at 657.
59. Id. at 650. See note 65 infra.
60. 405 U.S. at 648. Pursuant to the Illinois statute, there was a conclusive presump-
tion that unwed fathers were unfit to raise their child, thus making it unnecessary to hold
individualized hearings to determine whether particular fathers were in fact unfit parents
before they were separated from their children. Id at 647.
61. Id at 646.
62. See note 60 supra.
63. In Illinois, all that was required was proof of the death of the child's legal parent,
in this case the mother. 405 U.S. at 650.
64. Id at 646.
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disparate procedural treatment afforded unwed fathers in Illinois.'
The Stanley Court held that all unwed fathers could not, as Illinois had
maintained, be viewed as unsuitable and neglectful parents, because in-
evitably, some are wholly suited to have custody of their children."
The Court noted that Stanley was not shown to be a neglectful father.
Hence, contrary to Illinois law, Stanley, as all parents, had to be af-
forded the opportunity to be heard regarding his fitness as a parent
for his natural children."7 The Court ruled that application of a pre-
sumption that all unwed fathers were unfit ignored the realities of in-
dividual father-child relationships and did not advance the interests of
both parent and child." The Stanley ruling and rationale represented a
significant departure from the common law and early American case
law."" By extending procedural due process and equal protection
guarantees to the putative father, Stanley rebutted the long standing
presumption of unfitness."
65. Id. at 646-47. The Illinois Supreme Court rejected Stanley's constitutional argu-
ment. People v. Stanley, 45 Ill. 2d 132, 256 N.E.2d 814 (1970). Stanley's due process argu-
ment to the United States Supreme Court pointed out that legally married fathers,
whether separated or divorced, and all mothers were included in the definition of parent,
and thus entitled to a hearing as to their fitness. Since unwed fathers were not included
in the statutory definition of parent, they were not entitled to a hearing on their fitness.
Stanley contended that this denial of procedural due process resulted in a denial of his
equal protection rights. 405 U.S. at 649.
66. 405 U.S. at 654.
67. Id. at 655. The Court reasoned that "[tio say that the test of equal protection
should be the 'legal' rather than the biological relationship is to avoid the issue. For the
Equal Protection Clause necessarily limits the authority of a State to draw such 'legal'
lines as it chooses." Id at 652 (quoting Glona v. American Guar. & Liab. Ins. Co., 391 U.S.
73, 75-76 (1968)). The Court further clarified the basis of its analysis as follows:
But we are here not asked to evaluate the legitimacy of the state ends, rather,
to determine whether the means used to achieve these ends are constitutionally
defensible. What is the state interest in separating children from fathers without a
hearing designed to determine whether the father is unfit in a particular disputed
case? We observe that the State registers no gain towards its declared goals when
it separates children from the custody of fit parents. Indeed, if Stanley is a fit
father, the State spites its own articulated goals when it needlessly separates him
from his family.
Id. at 652-53.
68. Id. at 657-58.
69. See 10 AM. JUR. 2d Bastards §§ 60, 62 (1963); 2 AM. JUR. 2d Adoptions § 4 (1962).
70. 405 U.S. at 658. The Court's decision in Stanley v. Illinois soon resulted in the
extension of procedural due process protection of unwed fathers to adoption cases in
State v. Lutheran Social Servs., 47 Wis. 2d 420, 178 N.W.2d 56 (1970), vacated and
remanded sub nom. Rothstein v. Lutheran Social Servs., 405 U.S. 1051 (1972). Rothstein
was based on the Stanley rationale of considering the individual parent-child relationship.
An unwed mother had relinquished her child for adoption when the putative father aban-
doned her after refusing marriage. Id. at 422, 178 N.W.2d at 57. Following the birth and
relinquishment of the child by the mother, the putative father experienced a change of
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Caban v. Mohammed is based on the same concerns for the rights of
unwed fathers expressed in the Stanley decision. Caban, however, ex-
pands the rights of unwed fathers by allowing them to withhold con-
sent in matters of adoption in limited instances. In Stanley, the
children were already living with the putative father who merely
sought to continue the parent-child relationship as it had existed dur-
ing the mother's lifetime.71 In Caban, the mother had custody of the
children. However, both she and the putative father had taken legal
spouses prior to the adoption contest, and both could provide socially
recognized family units for the children's rearing." Thus, the Court's
decision in Caban, which granted a non-custodial father the right to
withhold consent to the adoption of his children by their natural
mother, places putative fathers on equal footing with all natural
parents. This expands the rule of Stanley since in that case, the puta-
tive father, who was the only living natural parent, was merely
granted the opportunity to a hearing on his fitness as a parent. This
due process right was not necessarily conclusive as to the future dispo-
sition of his children. Caban significantly holds that an unwed father
who has participated in the rearing of his child has a constitutional
right to directly control the choice of his children's rearing in so far as
an unwed mother has that right."
heart. Subsequent proposals of marriage went unanswered. Wisconsin required consent
only from the mother where there was no legal marriage. Id at 427, 178 N.W.2d at 60.
Rothstein challenged, on equal protection grounds, the Wisconsin statute's exclusion of
unwed fathers from the category of parent from whom consent was required in matters of
adoption. On remand, the Wisconsin court, following the Stanley directive, afforded due
consideration to the completion of the adoption proceedings and the fact that the child
had lived with his adoptive parents for a considerable period of time. In so doing, the
court determined that it would be in the best interest of the child to let the adoption
stand. State v. Lutheran Social Servs., 68 Wis. 2d 36, 41, 227 N.W.2d 643, 647 (1975).
71. 405 U.S. at 658.
72. Rothstein, discussed at note 70 supra, is likewise distinguishable from Caban. In
Rothstein, the question presented was not which natural parent should adopt the child,
but whether or not it would be in the best interest of the child to allow the child to be
adopted by a third party or by the putative father. 47 Wis.2d at 422, 178 N.W.2d at 658.
The natural parents had not lived together following the conception, birth and relinquish-
ment of the child for adoption by the mother. See note 70 supra.
73. 99 S. Ct. at 1768-69. The participation standard suggested by the Caban majority
refines and adds to the earlier factors used by the Court in developing a judicial concep-
tion of fatherhood. In Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246 (1978), a unanimous Supreme Court
found that the unwed father did not demonstrate sufficient participation in the life of his
child to warrant protection of his veto power over the adoption of his eleven year old
child by the child's mother and her husband. Id. at 256. Georgia required only the
mother's consent in cases where the child was illegitimate; but where the child was legiti-
mate, consent was required of both parents whether separated or divorced. Id. at 248-49.
The husband of the mother filed a petition for adoption of her child which was granted
over the objection of the father of the child. The Supreme Court upheld the constitu-
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The participation standard of Caban is expressly limited to situa-
tions where the adoption of a non-infant child is at issue.7' However, at
the core of the ruling is the recognition that an unwed father has con-
stitutionally protected rights with respect to his natural children ir-
respective of the father's legal relationship with his child's mother.
This expansion of Stanley gives unwed fathers an equal right to with-
hold consent from the adoption of their children even when the natural
mother is the proposed adoptive parent. The United States Supreme
Court has thus taken a further step toward developing discernible
boundaries for its concept of the natural law for unwed fathers. 5 The
Caban rationale, which is based upon the level of an unwed father's
participation in his child's life, takes judicial notice that protecting the
tionality of the Georgia statute in Quilloin since the facts indicated that the father never
sought, nor did he ever have legal custody of the child. Moreover his financial support and
personal contact with the child were erratic, and the putative father did not seek to adopt
the child but only to block the adoption of the child by Walcott. Finally, the Quilloin
Court noted that the family situation created by the adoption would not create a new
family, but would affirm an already existing relationship. The failure of the father to
establish a substantial relationship with the child or legitimize the child during her eleven
years proved crucial to the Court in Qtilloin. Id. at 255-56. In Caban, adequate participa-
tion was demonstrated by proof that the father had lived with the unwed mother prior to
and during the life of the child. It was particularly compelling to the Caban Court that the
putative father continued his substantial contact with the children following the break up
of the unmarried father-mother relationship. 99 S. Ct. at 1769.
74. 99 S. Ct. at 1768-69. Given that the Court has established participation as a key
element in determining an unwed father's protected parental rights, it seems reasonable
that an unwed father could demonstrate substantial participation in the life of the mother
and unborn fetus, thus extending the Caban rule to situations where the adoption of an in-
fant child is at issue. Using the participation standard, an unwed father could cohabitate
with the unwed mother, providing her with financial and emotional support. Additionally,
the unwed father could pay the medical expenses resulting from birth, voluntarily sign
the birth and baptismal certificates, agree to continue to financially and emotionally sup-
port the child, and generally function in a parental manner during the pre-natal and post-
natal periods. In essence an unwed father would need to do the things that the fathers in
Quilloin and Rothstein did not do, and that the fathers in Caban and Stanley did do. In
short it may be possible to raise an exceptional case which would have a significant effect
on this as yet untouched area of adoption law.
In some states, the putative father may be afforded protection on non-federal grounds.
See, e.g., Adoption of Walker, 468 Pa. 165, 360 A.2d 603 (1976), noted in 81 DICK. L. REV.
857 (1977) and 15 DuQ. L. REV. 757 (1977). In Walker, that portion of the Pennsylvania
adoption statute which required only the consent of the mother as a precondition to the
adoption of an illegitimate child was held unconstitutional as violative of the equal rights
amendment of the Pennsylvania Constitution. 468 Pa. at 170-71, 360 A.2d at 605-06.
75. In his dissenting opinion in Stanley v. Illinois, Chief Justice Burger stated that
the majority's invalidation of the Illinois statutory provision, which created a presumption
of the unfitness of unwed fathers, embarked the Court "on a novel concept of the natural
law for unwed fathers that could well have strange boundaries as yet undiscernible." 405
U.S. at 668 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
Vol. 18:375
1980 Recent Decisions 385
rights of parents, in the end, will provide for the best interests of the
child."8
Ronald J. Rademacher
76. See 434 U.S. at 251-55. Although the best interest standard is referred to by both
the Quilloin and Caban Courts, the variables used to determine what is in the best inter-
est of the child are not defined. The court in State v. Lutheran Social Servs., 59 Wis.2d 1,
207 N.W.2d 826 (1973) addressed the imprecision of this phrase by noting that:
The phrase, "best interests of the child," means all things to all people: it means
one thing to a juvenile judge, another thing to adoptive parents, something else to
natural parents, and still something different to disinterested observers. If judges
were endowed with omniscience, the problem would not be difficult; but the tenden-
cy in man is to apply intuition in deciding that a child would be "better" with one
set of parents than with another, and then to express this intuitive feeling in terms
of the legal standard of being "in the best interests of the child." Courts have not
laid down any definite guidelines which can be followed in every case to insure pro-
tection of what the average person means by "best interests."
Id. at 9-10, 207 N.W.2d at 831.

